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Patterns of Cooperation and Opposition
By Dru C. Gladney (USA)
In the summer of 2002, both the United States and the United Nations
supported China’s claim that an organization known as the East Turkistan Is-
lamic Movement (ETIM) should be recognized as an international terrorist or-
ganization.1  It is important to note, however, that China makes little distinction
between separatists, terrorists, and civil rights activists – whether they are
Uyghurs, Tibetans, Taiwanese, or Falun Gong Buddhists.  One person’s terror-
ist may be another’s freedom fighter.  Are the restive Uyghurs of Xinjiang ter-
rorists, separatists, or freedom fighters?  How can the incidents of recent years
be seen in the context of the Chinese efforts to integrate the region in the course
of two decades of the post-Deng reforms?
After denying the problem for decades and stressing instead China’s “na-
tional unity,” official reports and the state-run media began in early 2001 to
detail terrorist activities in the regions officially known as the Xinjiang Uyghur
Autonomous Region.2  Prior to the release of this document by the State Coun-
cil, and the subsequent media reports, the term “Eastern Turkestan” was not
allowed to be used in the official media, and anyone found using the term or
referring to Xinjiang as Eastern Turkestan could be arrested, even though this is
the term most often used outside China to refer to the region by Uyghurs and
other Turkic-speaking people.   In the northwestern Uyghur Autonomous Re-
gion of Xinjiang, China’s State Council and the official media an on-going se-
ries of incidents of terrorism and separatism since the large riot in the Xinjiang
town of Yining of February 1997, with multiple crackdowns and arrests that
have rounded up thousands of terrorist suspects, large weapons caches, and
printed documents allegedly outlining future public acts of violence.3
1 Erik Eckholm, “U.S. Labeling of Group in China as Terrorist is Criticized”
The New York Times September 13, 2002, p. 1.
2 Chinese State Council. White Paper on Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region. Beijing, February 2002. (will
need to check exact title and date). “China Also Harmed by Separatist-Minded Eastern Turkistan Terrorists,”
People’s Daily, October 10, 2001.
3 CNN News Service, Rym Brahimi, “Russia, China, and Central Asian Leaders Pledge to Fight Terrorism,
Drug Smuggling”, 25 August 1999 (electronic format <www.uygur.org/enorg/wunn99/990825e.html>)
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 Amnesty International has claimed that these round-ups have led to hur-
ried public trials and immediate, summary executions of possibly thousands of
locals.  One estimate suggested that in a country known for its frequent execu-
tions, Xinjiang had the highest number, averaging 1.8 per week, most of them
Uyghur.4   Troop movements to the area, related to the nationwide campaign
against crime known as “Strike Hard” launched in 1998 that includes the call to
erect a “great wall of steel” against separatists in Xinjiang, were reportedly the
largest since the suppression of the large Akto insurrection in April 1990 (the
first major uprising that initiated a series of unrelated and sporadic protests).5
Alleged incursions of Taliban fighters through the Wakhan corridor into China
where Xinjiang shares a narrow border with Afghanistan have led to the area
being swamped with Chinese security forces and large military exercises, be-
ginning at least one month prior to the September 11th attack.  Under US and
Chinese pressure, Pakistan returned one Uyghur activist to China, apprehended
among hundreds of Taliban detainees, which follows a pattern of repatriations
of suspected Uyghur separatists from Kazakstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan.6
International campaigns for Uyghur rights and possible independence have
become increasingly vocal and well organized, especially on the internet.  Re-
peated public appeals have been made to Abdulahat Abdurixit, the Uyghur
People’s Government Chairman of Xinjiang in Urumqi.   International organi-
zations are increasingly including Uyghur indigenous voices from the expatri-
ate Uyghur community.  Notably, the 1995 elected chair of the Unrepresented
Nations and People’s Organization (UNPO) based in the Hague is a Uyghur,
Erkin Alptekin, son of the separatist leader, Isa Yusuf Alptekin, who is buried in
Istanbul where there is a park dedicated to his memory.7  Supporting primarily
an audience of mostly expatriate Uyghurs, there are at least 25 international
organizations and web sites working for the independence of “Eastern Turkestan,”
and based in Amsterdam, Munich, Istanbul, Melbourne, Washington, DC and
New York.  Following 11 September 2001, the vast majority of these organiza-
4 Amnesty International, People’s Republic of China: Gross Violations of Human Rights in the Xinjiang
Uighur Autonomous Region (London, 21 April 1999), p. 24.
5 Hutzler, Charles, “Trade is China’s Carrot to Muslim Separatists,” Wall Street Journal, September 21, 2001.
6 Eckholm, Erik, Smith, Craig S., “Fearing Unrest, China Pressures Muslim Group,” New York Times, Octo-
ber 5, 2001; Pun, Pamela, “Separatists Trained in Afghanistan, says Official,” The Standard, posted at hk-
imail.singtao.com/inews/public/article_v.cfm?articleid=30156&intcatid=2, October 22, 2001.
7 See writings by Isa Yusuf Alptekin’s son, Erkin Alptekin, which also present alternative histories of the
Uyghur from that of the Chinese state: Alptekin, Erkin, Uygur Türkleri [The Uygur Turks]. Istanbul: Boðaziçi
Yayýnlarý, 1978; and  ‘Xinjiang a Time Bomb Waiting to Explode,’ South ChinaMorning Post (Hong Kong), 29
May, 2002. For Alptekin’s involvement with the Unrecognized Nations and Peoples Organization in The Hague,
see their website: www.unpo.org/member/eturk.html.
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tions disclaimed any support for violence or terrorism, pressing for a peaceful
resolution of on-going conflicts in the region.  Nevertheless, the growing influ-
ence of “cyber-separatism” is of increasing concern to Chinese authorities seek-
ing to convince the world that the Uyghurs do pose a real domestic and interna-
tional terrorist threat.
The real question is, what changes in the region have the events of
September 11th wrought in terms of local response to Chinese rule? It is clear
that the so-called separatist activities are not new and that China is taking ad-
vantage of the international war on terrorism to attempt to eradicate a domestic
problem. The Istanbul-based groups have existed since the 1950s, the Central
Asian Uyghurs under Soviet rule received tremendous support in their anti-
China rhetoric regarding policies in Xinjiang, and the Uyghurs have been in-
creasingly vocal since the independence of the Central Asian Republics in 1991
led many to hope for an independent Uyghuristan would have followed on the
heels of the other newly independent -stans.  Separatist actions have taken place
on a small but regular basis since the expansion of market and trade policies in
China, and with the opening of six overland gateways to Xinjiang in addition to
the trans-Eurasian railway, and China’s Western development campaign, there
seems to be no chance of closing up shop.  The Chinese government itself in a
landmark 1999 white paper, admitted serious economic shortfalls in the region
despite 50 years of state investment in the development of the region: “The
Chinese government is well aware of the fact that…central and western China
where most minority people live, lags far behind the eastern coastal areas in
development.”8
In previous years, China denied any serious social or political problems in
the region and followed the old Soviet “divide-and-rule” strategy which sought
to limit all references to Turkestan or even Turkology that might link the Uyghurs,
Kazakhhs, and other Turkic-speaking minorities to broader pan-Turkic move-
ments.  Yet certainly since early 2001, due to the desire to receive international
support for its domestic war on terrorism, China’s Foreign Ministry and the
People’s Daily have documented an on-going series of incidents of terrorism
and separatism since the large riot in the Xinjiang town of Yining of February
1997, with multiple crackdowns and arrests that have rounded up thousands of
terrorist suspects, large weapons caches, and printed documents allegedly out-
8 Information Office of the State Council of the People’s Republic of China “National Minority Policies and
Its Practice in China”, 1999, p. 50.   See also the Law of the People’s Republic of China on Regional National
Autonomy (1984), with full text of White Paper on Minority Policies, September 28, 1999, at www.China.org.cn.
For poverty in the region specifically among the Uyghur, see Gilley, Bruce, “’Uyghurs need not Apply,’” Far
Eastern Economic Review, August 28, 2001
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lining future public acts of violence.  In June 2002, under US and Chinese pres-
sure, Pakistan returned one Uyghur activist to China, apprehended among hun-
dreds of Taliban detainees, which follows a pattern of repatriations of suspected
Uyghur separatists in Kazakhhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan.  This detainee
was supposedly one of several hundred Uyghurs arrested fighting with the
Taliban, with up to 6 Uyghurs placed in the Guantanomo Bay detention facility.9
Clearly, domestic responses to Chinese rule have changed dramatically in the
last 20 years for there to be large groups of Uyghur militant Muslims fighting
abroad, and for the Chinese government to publicize separatist actions inside
and outside the region, launching large-scale suppressions of potential terror-
ists. Nevertheless, despite China’s increasing crackdowns, fewer reports of civil
unrest or terrorist acts have been reported since the late 1990s.  This suggests a
changing pattern of opposition to Chinese rule in the region.
LOYALTY, VOICE, Or EXIT?
Taking inspiration from the Princeton economist Albert O. Hirschman’s
classic model regarding participation in organizations and states,10 one might
locate certain patterns of response to Chinese rule since 1978.  Although
Hirschman’s theory of “Exit, Voice, or Loyalty” was applied to institutions and
states in decline, and this volume has argued that China’s presence in Xinjiang
has anything but declined, nevertheless it could be argued that for many Uyghur
these are the main options available to them in a region where their own popu-
lation numbers and influence have declined precipitously over the last 50 years
of Chinese rule.  It was clear that the post-Cultural Revolution period in the
region was welcomed by most Xinjiang residents due to the harsh treatment of
minorities and religious practitioners between 1966 and 1976.  Indeed, many
Muslims point to the 20 years of discrimination against religious practice since
the initiation of the Religious System Reform Campaign in 1958, which led
throughout the country to the further consolidation and restriction of religious
practice.11  With the Deng liberalization of the marketplace, cultural and reli-
gious practice also flourished, leading to widespread mosque-building and the
9 “Uyghur Separatist Sentenced to Death,” Reuters, October 18, 2001; Smith, Craig S., “Fearing Unrest,
China Pressures Muslim Group,” New York Times, October 5, 2001; Pun, Pamela, “Separatists Trained in Af-
ghanistan, says Official,” The Standard, posted at hk-imail.singtao.com/inews/public/
article_v.cfm?articleid=30156&intcatid=2, October 22, 2001
10  Albert O. Hirschman, Exit, Voice, or Loyalty; Response to Decline in Firms, Organizations, and States.
Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1972.
11 See Dru C. Gladney, Muslim Chinese: Ethnic Nationalism in the People’s Republic Cambridge: Harvard
University Press, 1996, pp. 122-30.
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revival of religious education in the region.  It was during this period that most
of the mosques in the region were built or reopened, Islamic training of young
Imams permitted, and pilgrimages to Mecca resumed.  Indeed, there are many
residents of Xinjiang, Uyghurs included, who continue to strongly support the
Deng Xiaoping reforms as they have been continued under Jiang Zemin and
now Hu Juntao.  As loyal citizens, they see the dramatic progress made since the
end of the Cultural Revolution and generally share in the government’s vision of
a modernized, developed Xinjiang region.  Working not only in the state sector
as cadres, teachers, production corps farmers, and factory workers, but also in
the growing private sector in private and semi-private small businesses, these
supporters of the state’s development program are generally quite unwilling to
listen to any criticism of state policies, especially from outsiders or disgruntled
minorities.  Given the lack of public polling or uncensored media in the region,
it is difficult to ascertain if these supporters are a silent majority or a tiny minor-
ity, speaking out in support of state policies because it serves their interest.
Nevertheless, the Deng reform era in general can be characterized as a period of
heightened loyalty to the state and new-found optimism after the previous 20
years of internal chaos and repression, similar in many respects to the period of
relative loyalty when Xinjiang was first brought into the PRC and established as
an Autonomous Region.
However, in the late 1980s and mid-1990s, this period of “loyalty” gave
way to increasing expressions of “voice”, not only among Uyghur but also among
a wide cross-section of local residents that felt the northwest was not keeping
pace with the rapid development of the rest of the country.  Many Uyghurs were
particularly disappointed that the independence of the former Soviet Central
Asian Republics in 1991 did not lead to independence or at least increased
autonomy in their own Autonomous Region.  Throughout the early and mid-
1990s, increasing expressions of “voice” demonstrated these concerns from
university protests to greater ethnic and civil unrest.  Whether there were smaller,
unreported incidents in the past, the mid-1990s witnessed an number of public
expressions of dissent and dissatisfaction with state policies in the region.
The 1990s period of voiced opposition began with the report of a major
uprising in Akto County (near Kashgar) in April 1990, that official reports stated
involved and “armed counter-revolutionary rebellion” suppressed by the People’s
Liberation Army that led to twenty-two deaths.12  In 1995, Chinese People’s
12 See discussions of this event which had only sketchy reports by Mackerras, Colin.  The New Cambridge
Handbook of Contemporary China.   2001.  p. 38; and Michael Dillon.  Xinjiang: Ethnicity, Separatism and Control
in Chinese Central Asia.  1995.  p. 26.
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Police reported finding  a large weapons cache, and in May 1996, a Xinjiang
People’s Political Consultative Conference official was assassinated, all later
attributed to “East Turkestan” terrorists.13
In the Spring of 1996, the Xinjiang Daily reported five serious social erup-
tions in the region since February 1996, with a crackdown that rounded up 2,773
terrorist suspects, 6,000 lbs of explosives, and 31,000 rounds of ammunition.
Overseas Uyghur groups claimed that over 10,000 were arrested in the round-
up, with over 1,000 killed.14 The largest protest from 2 to 8 February 1996, was
sparked by a Chinese raid on an evening Mashrap cultural meeting, where young
Uighur men and women gather for prayer, singing of religious and folk songs,
and feasting.15  Protests against the arrests made during the meeting led to 120
deaths and over 2,500 arrests.  Immediately following the uprising and crack-
down in Yining, on February 25th, the day of Deng Xiaoping’s memorial speech,
in a well-coordinated operation, three bombs exploded simultaneously on three
buses in downtown Urumqi leading to 20 civilian deaths and scores of injured
(including some Uyghurs), with the subsequent execution of eight Uighurs al-
legedly responsible for the bombings.16
Later that spring, the violence came to Beijing when on March 7 and then
again on  March 8, two separate bombs exploded on public buses.  The first
bomb in Xidan claimed three lives with ten injured, while the second bomb
killed two.  The bombs were timed to take place during the Chinese National
Peoples Congress and were widely attributed to Uyghur separatists, though this
has never been independently verified and no group has ever claimed responsi-
bility.17  On 29 May 1996 the pro-government mullah of Kashgar’s Idgah mosque,
Arunkhanji, and his son were stabbed by knife-wielding Uyghur militants, on
27 May there was another attack on a senior government official, and in Sep-
13 Reported in McNeal, Dewardic L.  “China’s Relations with Central Asian States and Problems with Terror-
ism.”  US Department of State, Congressional Research Service Report, 2001.  http://fpc.state.gov/documents/
organization/7945.pdf.
14 Xinjiang Daily, April 9, 1997 from People’s Republic of China: Gross Violation of Human Rights in the
Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region, Amnesty International, 1999; Reuters, Beijing, June 26, 1997, citing the
Xinjiang Daily of July 21, 1997
15 See Ildiko Beller-Hann,  “Making the Oil Fragrant: Dealings with the Supernatural Among the Uyghurs in
Xinjiang.”  Asian Ethnicity  2001, 2.1. pp. 9-23; see also Nathan Light’s dissertation, Slippery Paths: The Perfor-
mance and Canonization of Turkic Literature and Uyghur Muqam Song in Islam and Modernity, Indiana Univer-
sity, Bloomington, 1998, as well as his very informative webpage on Uyghur and Turkic culture and art, http://
www.utoledo.edu/~nlight/mainpage.htm.
16 McNeal, op. cit.
17 See “A Bomb in Beijing,” The Economist, March 13, 1997; Tyler, Patrick E., “Chinese Muslims Recount
Their Days of Terror,” New York Times, Sunday, November 10, 1996; p.3.  Note that many Uyghurs in the
diaspora believe that the bombs were set by Chinese authorities in order to justify a crackdown on Uyghurs in
Xinjiang.
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tember of the same year six Uyghur government officials were killed by other
Uyghurs in Yecheng.
The Yining uprising on 7 February 1997, and the subsequent bombings in
Urumqi and Beijing, were heavily covered by the world’s media.18  This distin-
guishes the late 1990s events from on-going problems in the region in the mid-
1980s that met with little media coverage.
In the late 1990s, the government responded with a host of arrests and
new policy announcements. In Spring 1998, the National Peoples Congress
passed a New Criminal Law that redefined “counter-revolutionary” crimes to
be “crimes against the state”, liable to severe prison terms and even execution.
Included in “crimes against the state” were any actions considered to involve
“ethnic discrimination” or “stirring up anti-ethnic sentiment.”19   Many human
rights activists have argued that this is a thinly veiled attempt to criminalize
“political” actions and to make them appear as illegal as traffic violations, sup-
porting China’s claims that it holds “no political prisoners”. Since any minority
activity could be regarded as stirring “anti-ethnic feeling”, many ethnic activists
are concerned that the New Criminal Law will be easily turned against them.
The “Strike Hard Campaign”, launched in Beijing in April 1997 was origi-
nally intended to clamp down on crime and corruption, and included severe
restrictions on religious practice.20 These campaigns, according to an April 1999
Amnesty International report, have led to 210 capital sentences and 190 execu-
tions of Uyghur since 1997.21
The 1997 riot in Xining described above marked the apex of rioting and
civil unrest among the Uyghur.  After 1997 there was a marked decline in Xinjiang
civil unrest and so-called separatist events, perhaps because of the government’s
harsh crackdown and arrest of prominent Uyghur activists. On 11 August 1999,
Rebiya Kadeer, a well known Uyghur business woman once a delegate to the
1995 Beijing International Women’s Conference, who was scheduled to meet
with a United States Congressional Research Service delegation to the region,
was arrested for “revealing state secrets.”22  Human rights activists claim that
she was merely handing over Xinjiang news items previously published in the
official news media to be taken back to her husband, currently living in exile in
18 “China Fears for its Wild West,” The Economist, November 13, 1997.
19 Amnesty International, op.cit., p. 21.
20 Reuters, Beijing, June 26, 1997, citing the Xinjiang Daily of July 21, 1997; See Becquelin, Nicolas, “Xinjiang
in the Nineties,” The China Journal, No.44, July 2001.
21 Amnesty International, Op. cit..
22 Wall Street Journal, Ian Johnson, “China Arrests Noted Businesswoman in Crackdown in Muslim Region”,
18 August 1999
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Washington, D.C.  After reviewing her case, Amnesty International concluded
that there was not enough evidence to detain her and launched an international
campaign in the spring of 2002, designating her as their detainee of the month in
hopes of winning her release.23
Despite on-going tensions and frequent reports of isolated terrorist acts,
there has been no evidence that any of these actions have been aimed at disrupt-
ing the economic development of the region. Most confirmed incidents have
been directed against Han Chinese security forces, recent Han Chinese émigrés
to the region, and even Uyghur Muslims perceived to be too closely collaborat-
ing with the Chinese Government.24 Most analysts agree that China is not vul-
nerable to the same ethnic separatism that split the former Soviet Union. But
few doubt that should China fall apart, it would divide, like the USSR, along
centuries old ethnic, linguistic, regional, and cultural fault lines.25  If China did
fall apart, Xinjiang would split in a way that, according to Anwar Yusuf, Presi-
dent of the Eastern Turkistan National Freedom Center in Washington DC, “would
make Kosovo look like a birthday party”.  It should be noted that despite the
fear of widespread civil disorder, Mr Yusuf indicated that the Eastern Turkistan
National Freedom Center continued to support a free and independent Xinjiang.26
On 4 June 1999 Mr Yusuf met with President Clinton to press for fuller support
for the Uyghur cause.27 Subsequent Uyghur organizations have sought to pres-
sure the Bush administration with varying degrees of success.  Now many fear
that with the U.S and China cooperating on a war on terrorism, there is no hope
for U.S. support of Uyghur human rights’ issues.
Since the high-point of the late 1990s expressions of voice and ethnic
violence, there has been a gradual decline in the scale and number of incidents.
Documented separatist and violent incidents in Xinjiang have dropped off dra-
matically since the late 1990s.  Philip Pan reported in a July 14, 2002 Washing-
ton Post interview that local Xinjiang security officials were only able to cite
three relatively small occurrences.28  Interestingly, few have noted that despite
23 See article, “Amnesty International Women’s Rights Action 2000 Women’s Rights are Human Rights The
Struggle Persists – CHINA Arbitrary Detention of Rebiya Kadeer - a women’s human rights defender and prisoner
of conscience” AI Index: ASA 17/04/00.
http://web.amnesty.org/802568F7005C4453/0/08216A2C1385F107802568790040 AB7 1?Open
 24 Two exceptions include a reported derailment of a Xinjiang train due to a bombing on February 12, 1997,
and an attack on a power station in Hejing on July 10, 1999 (unpublished Rand Report).  These incidents, and the
Beijing and Urumqi bus bombings of 1997, represent the only examples of well-organized terrorist activities di-
rected against civilians.
25 Dru C. Gladney, “China’s Ethnic Reawakening”, Asia Pacific Issues, No. 18 (1995), pp. 1-8
26 Anwar Yusuf, President of the Eastern Turkistan National Freedom Center, Washington DC. Personal inter-
view, 14 April 1999
27 Turkistan News & Information Network, “Press Release”, 8 June 1999
28 Philip Pan “In China’s West, Ethnic Strife Becomes ‘Terrorism’”Washington Post July 14, 2002: A4.
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many incidents of ethnic and civil unrest in the region, not one significant ter-
rorist attack against any strategic infrastructural target (oil refinery, pipeline,
railroad, dam, or bridge) has ever been documented, nor have any local or inter-
national incidents been positively identified with any international Uyghur or
Islamic organization.  In addition, visitors to the region have increasingly re-
ported a sense of disillusionment and disappointment among activists.  One
acquaintance mentioned to this author in late August 2001, “We’ve given up on
independence, we just want to immigrate.”  Loyalty and voice, for many young
Uyghur, have turned to exit.
CYBER-SEPARATISM: VIRTUAL VOICES IN THE
UYGHUR OPPOSITION
Though silenced within China, Uyghur voices can still be heard virtually,
on the internet.  Perhaps due to Chinese restrictions on public protest and a
state-controlled media, or the deleterious effect of a war on domestic terrorism
that this paper has documented began in the late 1990s, very few Uyghur voices
can be heard today in the region critical of Chinese policies, at least not public
ones.   Interestingly, only by exercising Hirschman’s alternative possibility of
“exit” can Uyghur oppositional voices continue to be heard.  International cam-
paigns for Uyghur rights and possible independence have become increasingly
vocal and well organized, especially on the internet.   Supporting primarily an
audience of approximately over 500,000 expatriate Uyghurs (yet few Uyghurs
in Central Asia and China have access to these internet sites) there are at least 25
international organizations and web sites working for the independence of “East-
ern Turkestan,” and based in Amsterdam, Munich, Istanbul, Melbourne, Wash-
ington, DC and New York.29
Although the United Nations and the United States government have agreed
with China that at least one international organization, ETIM, is a Uyghur-spon-
sored terrorist organization, the vast majority of the Eastern Turkestan indepen-
dence and information organizations disclaim violence.  Supported largely by
Uyghur émigré’s who left China prior to the Communist takeover in 1949, these
29 Estimates differ widely on the number of Uyghurs living outside of China in the diaspora.  Uyghurs in
Central Asia are not always well-represented in the State censuses, particularly since 1991.  Shichor estimates
approximately 500,000 living abroad, about 5-6% of the total world Uyghur population, see Yitzhak Shichor,
“Virtual Transnationalism: Uygur Communities in Europe and the Quest for Eastern Turkestan Independence.”
Unpublished paper, 2002.  Shichor notes that as in many statistical matters, Uyghur websites differ dramatically on
the official Uyghur population numbers, from up to 25 million Uyghur inside Xinjiang, to up to 10 million in the
diaspora, see, for example, www.Uyghur.org, the site supported by Anwar Yusuf, President of the Eastern Turkistan
National Freedom Center in Washington, D.C.
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organizations maintain a plethora of websites and activities that take a primarily
negative view of Chinese policies in the region.  Although not all organizations
advocate independence or separatism, the vast majority of them do press for
radical change in the region, detailing not only human rights violations, but
environmental degradation, economic imbalances and alternative histories of
the region.  In general, these websites can be divided roughly into those that are
mainly information-based and others that are politically active advocacy sites.
Nevertheless, whether informational or advocacy, nearly all of them are critical
of Chinese policies in Xinjiang.30
It is difficult to assess who the audience is for these websites, as they are
all blocked in China, and mostly inaccessible in Central Asia due to either inad-
equate internet access or the high costs of getting on the net.  Many Uyghurs I
have talked with in China and in Central Asia have never heard of most of these
sites.  Interestingly, government officials in Xinjiang interested in the informa-
tion provided on these sites also have said they do not have access. It is clear
that Uyghurs in the Western diaspora, particularly in Europe, Turkey, the United
States, Canada, and Australia are frequent readers and contributors to these sites.
In addition, events in the region since September 11 have led an increasing
number of journalists and interested observers of the region to begin visiting the
sites more regularly.   In terms of content, it is interesting to note that a cursory
monitoring of these sites reveals very little that can be associated with militant
or radical Islam, and almost no calls for an Islamic “Jihad” against the Chinese
state.  Most of the issues as noted above involve documenting the plight and
history of the Uyghurs under Chinese rule in Xinjiang as opposed to their glori-
ous, independent past and long history in the region.  It is also important to note
that few Chinese inside or outside of China have visited these sites so that they
are quite unaware of these alternative histories.  Although there are several sites
available in Turkish and Uyghur, there is not one in Chinese.  As such, like all
30 Key informational websites that mainly provide Uyghur and Xinjiang related news and analyses, include the
Turkistan Newsletter maintained by Mehmet Tutuncu of  SOTA, www.euronet.nl/users/sota/turkistan.html, the
Open Society Institute’s www.erasianet.org, The Uyghur Information Agency’s www.uyghurinfo.com, www.wlc.org,
and the virtual library of the Australian National University based “Eastern Turkestan WWW VL” www.ccs.uky.edu/
~rakhim/et.html.  Advocacy sites that promote support for Uyghur- and Xinjiang-related causes, include Free
Eastern Turkestan initiated by Jack Churchward, www.caccp.org/et, the East Turkestan Information Center
www.uygur.org, the Eastern Turkestan National Freedom Center www.uyghur.org, The Uyghur Human Rights
Coalition www.uyghurs.org, and other more popular sites including www.taklamakan.org, www.ugyur.net,
www.kivilcim.com, www.doguturkistan.net, www.turpan.com, www.afn.org,  www.eastturkistan.com.  As most
of these sites are cross-linked, they often repeat and pass along information contained on other sites.  For a survey
of many of these websites, see Shichor, op. cit..  There are a host of Central Asia-related sites that increasingly
contain information and discussion of events in Xinjiang, see Harvard’s Forum for Central Aisan Studies,
www.fas.harvard.edu/~centasia .
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internet groups, it is a self-selected audience and rarely reaches beyond those
who already support and are interested in the agenda supported by the site.
Financial support for these organizations and websites come mostly from pri-
vate individuals, foundations, and subscriptions (though these are rare).  While
it has been reported that wealthy Uyghur patrons in Saudi Arabia and Turkey,
who became successful running businesses after migrating to these countries in
the 1940s, have strongly supported these organizations financially in the past,
there is no publicly available information on these sources.
Although most of these websites have limited funding and circulation,
they should not be dismissed as forming only a “virtual” community without
any substantial impact on events within Xinjiang.  Not only have these websites
served as an important source of information not available in the official Chi-
nese media, but some scholars have begun to argue that internet sites often help
to sway public opinion by virtue of their widespread availability and alternative
reporting of important events.31  While analysts are divided about the potency of
the internet for swaying public opinion or influencing domestic events, there is
an emerging consensus that it has clearly altered the way information is circu-
lated and opinions are formed.  Perhaps more importantly, scholars have con-
cluded that the “virtual communities” formed by internet websites establish links
and connections that can lead to broad social interactions and coalitions which
have impacted political and socio-economic events.   For example, it has been
shown that social movements in East Timor, Aceh, Chechnya, and Bosnia have
been given strong support through these internet communities, providing not
only increased information but large financial transfers as well.32  While “cyber-
separatism” would never be able on its own to unseat a local government, it is
clear that it does link like-minded individuals and raise consciousness about
issues that were often inaccessible to the general public.  For an isolated region
such as Xinjiang, and the widely dispersed Uyghur diaspora, the internet has
dramatically altered the way the world sees the region and the Chinese state
must respond to issues within it.
31 For studies of the influence of internet in influencing wider public opinion in Asia, see a recent collection of
essays in the Asian Journal of Social Science edited by Zaheer Baber in a special focus on “The Internet and Social
Change in Asia and Beyond”, Vol. 30, No 2, 2002.
32 See Derek Foster,  1997.  “Community and Identity in the Electronic Village” in David Porter, editor.
Internet Culture.  New York: Routledge Press; Steven G.  Jones, 1997.  “The Internet and Its Social Landscape” in
Steven G. Jones, editor. Virtual Culture: Identity and Community in Cybersociety.  London, New Delhi: Sage; Tim
Jordan, 1999. Cyberpower: The Culture and Politics of Cyberspace and the Internet.  London and New York:
Routlege; Douglas Rushkoff, 1994. Cyberia: Life in the Trenches of Hyperspace.  New York: Harper Collins;  and
Mark A. Smith and Peter Kollock, editors.  1999. Communities in Cyberspace.  London and New York: Routledge.
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It is clear that there are more than just internet organizations involved in
separatist activities in and around Xinjiang.  As noted above, the East Turkestan
Islamic Movement (ETIM) was recognized by the United Nations in October
2002 as an international terrorist organization responsible for domestic and in-
ternational terrorist acts, which China claimed included a bombing of the Chi-
nese consulate in Istanbul, assassinations of Chinese officials in Bishkek, and
Uighur officials in Kashgar thought to collaborate with Chinese officialdom.33
This designation, however, created a controversy in that China and the
U.S. presented little public evidence to positively link the ETIM organization
with the specific incidents described. 34 In 2001, the US State Department re-
leased a report that documented several separatist and terrorist groups operat-
ing inside the region and abroad,  militating for an independent Xinjiang.35  The
list included “The United Revolutionary Front of Eastern Turkestan” whose
leader Yusupbek (Modan) Mukhlisi claimes to have 30 armed units with “20
million” Uyghurs primed for an uprising; the “Home of East Turkistan Youth,”
said to be linked to Hamas with a reported 2000 members, the “Free Turkistan
Movement” whose leader Abdul Kasim is said to have led the 1990 Baren up-
rising discussed above; the Organization for the Liberation of Uighuristan” how
leader Ashir Vakhidi is said to be committed to the fighting Chinese “occupa-
tion” of the “Uighur homeland;” and the so-called “Wolves of Lop Nor” who
have claimed responsibility for various bombings and uprisings.  The State De-
partment report claims that all of these groups have tenuous links with al Qaeda,
Taliban, the Hizb-ut-Tahrir (“Islamic Revival”), and the Tableeghi Jamaat.  Many
of these groups were listed in the Chinese report that came out in early 2002, but
failed to mention ETIM.  It came as some surprise, therefore, when at the con-
clusion of his August 2001 visit to Beijing, Deputy Secretary of State Richard
Armitage identified ETIM as the leading Uyghur group to be targeted as an
international terrorist group.36 The main issue for those critical of this designa-
33 The East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM) is known only as a shadowy group known only to be
previously active in  Afghanistan and founded in the mid-90s by Hassan Mashum.  Mahsum had served three years
in a labor camp in Xinjiang and who recruited other Uighurs, including his number three leader Rashid who was
captured with the Taliban and returned to China in Spring 2001.  See Hutzler, Charles, “China-Iraq Policy Is Risky
For US” Asian Wall Street Journal, September 10, 2001.
34 “China Also Harmed by Separatist-Minded Eastern Turkistan Terrorists,” People’s Daily, October 10, 2001;
Eckholm, Erik, “U.S. Labeling of Group in China as Terrorist is Criticized,” New York Times, September 13,
2002; Hutzler, Charles, “U.S. Gesture to China Raises  Crackdown Fears” Wall Street Journal, September 13,2002.
35 McNeal, Dewardic L.  “China’s Relations with Central Asian States and Problems with Terrorism.”  US
Department of State, Congressional Research Service Report, 2001.  See also Scott Fogden’s excellent thesis,
Writing Insecurity: The PRC’s Push to Modernize China and the Politics of Uighur Identity.  MscEcon Thesis,
University of Wales, Aberystwyth, 2002
36 Conclusion of China Visit Press Conference, Deputy Secretary of State Richard L. Armitage, Beijing,
China, U.S. Department of State, August 26, 2002.
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tion, with so many identified groups, why was ETIM singled out, unless it was
for the political purpose of strengthening US-China relations.  The real issue for
this paper, however, is that despite the designation of ETIM, there are active
Uyghur-related terrorist groups which can be said to be supportive of terrorism,
but have never been proved to be directly implicated in any specific incident.
Chinese authorities are clearly concerned that increasing international at-
tention to the treatment of its minority and dissident peoples have put pressure
on the region, with the US and many Western governments continuing to criti-
cize China for not adhering to its commitments to signed international agree-
ments and human rights.  Last year China ratified the International Covenant on
Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights. Article One of the covenant says:  “All
peoples have the right of self-determination. By virtue of that right they freely
determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cul-
tural development.” Article 2 reads: “All peoples may, for their own ends, freely
dispose of their natural wealth and resources without prejudice to any obliga-
tions arising out of international economic co-operation, based upon the prin-
ciple of mutual benefit, and international law. In no case may a people be de-
prived of its own means of subsistence.” Although China continues to quibble
with the definition of “people”, it is clear that the agreements are pressuring
China to answer criticisms by Mary Robinson and other high-ranking human
rights advocates about its treatment of minority peoples.  Clearly, with Xinjiang
representing the last Muslim region under communism, large trade contracts
with Middle Eastern Muslim nations, and 5 Muslim nations on its western bor-
ders, Chinese authorities have more to be concerned about than just interna-
tional support for human rights.
China’s Uyghur separatists are small in number, poorly equipped, loosely
linked, and vastly out-gunned by the People’s Liberation Army and People’s
Police. And note that though sometimes disgruntled about other rights’ and mis-
treatment issues, China’s nine other official Muslim minorities do not in general
support Uyghur separatism.   Rudelson and Jankowiak have noted the enmity
between Uyghur and Hui (Tungan) in the region.  Few Hui support an indepen-
dent Xinjiang, and one million Kazakh in Xinjiang would have very little say in
an independent “Uyghuristan”.  Local support for separatist activities, particu-
larly in Xinjiang and other border regions, is ambivalent and ambiguous at best,
given the economic disparity between these regions and their foreign neighbors,
including Tadjikistan, Kygyzstan, Pakistan, and especially Afghanistan.  Memo-
ries in the region are strong of mass starvation and widespread destruction dur-
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ing the Sino-Japanese and civil war in the first half of this century, including
intra-Muslim and Muslim-Chinese bloody conflicts, not to mention the chaotic
horrors of the Cultural Revolution.  Many local activists are calling not for
complete separatism or real independence, but generally express concerns over
environmental degradation, anti-nuclear testing, religious freedom, over-taxa-
tion, and recently imposed limits on childbearing.  Many ethnic leaders are sim-
ply calling for “real” autonomy according to Chinese law for the five Autono-
mous Regions that are each led by First Party Secretaries who are all Han Chi-
nese controlled by Beijing.  Freedom of Religion, protected by China’s consti-
tution, does not seem to be a key issue, as mosques are full in the region and
pilgrimages to Mecca are often allowed for Uyghur and other Muslims (though
recent visitors to the region report an increase in restrictions against mosque
attendance by youth, students, and government officials).  In addition, Islamic
extremism does not as yet appear to have widespread appeal, especially among
urban, educated Uyghur, as Lipman and Fuller have noted.  However, the gov-
ernment has consistently rounded up any Uyghur suspected of being “too” reli-
gious, especially those identified as Sufis or the so-called Wahabbis (a euphe-
mism in the region for strict Muslim, not an organized Islamic school).   The
admitted problem of Uyghur terrorism and dissent, even in the diaspora, is thus
problematic for a government that wants to encourage integration and develop-
ment in a region where the majority population are not only ethnically different,
but also devoutly Muslim.  How does a government integrate a strongly reli-
gious minority (be it Muslim, Tibetan, Christian, or Buddhist) into a Marxist-
Capitalist system?
PROSPECTS FOR THE FUTURE: NEW MODELS FOR
CHINA’S NEW REGION?
To an extent never seen before, the continued incorporation of Xinjiang
into China has become inexorable, and perhaps irreversible. The need for the
oil and mineral resources of the region since China became an oil importing
nation in 1993 means that Chinese influence will only grow. To be sure, the
Uyghur are still oriented culturally and historically toward Central Asia in terms
of religion, language, and ethnic custom, and interaction has increased in recent
years due to the opening of the roads to Pakistan and Almaty. Certainly, pan-
Turkism was appealing to some, but not all, Uyghurs during the early part of
this century. Historical ties to Central Asia are strong. Yet separatist notions,
given the current political incorporation of Xinjiang into China, while perhaps
present, are not practicable. As noted above, this is predicated on the assump-
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tion that China as a nation holds together. If China should fail at the centre, the
peripheries will certainly destabilize, with Xinjiang and Tibet having the stron-
gest prospects for separation given the history of dissent and organized separat-
ist activities in the region.  It is important to note here that other border regions
with large minority populations, such as Yunnan, Guizhou, Guangxi (with 16
million Zhuang), Hainan, and even the Ningxia Hui Autonomous Region, have
not had any reported separatist or terrorist activities.  Clearly, by its own admis-
sion, the problems in Xinjiang and the oppositional voices of mostly Uyghur
groups must be addressed by the state.
The problems facing Xinjiang, however, are much greater than those of
Tibet if it were to become independent. Not only is it more integrated into the
rest of China, but the Uyghur part of the population is less than half of the total
and primarily located in the south, where there is less industry and natural re-
sources, except for oil. As noted above, however, unless significant investment
is found, Tarim oil and energy resources will never be a viable source of inde-
pendent wealth. Poor past relations between the three main Muslim groups,
Uyghur, Kazakh, and Hui, suggest that conflicts among Muslims would be as
great as those between Muslims and Han Chinese. Most local residents believe
that independence would lead to significant conflicts between these groups, along
ethnic, religious, urban-rural, and territorial lines. Given the harsh climate and
poor resources in the region, those caught in the middle would have few places
to flee. Xinjiang Han would naturally seek to return to the interior of China,
since Russia and Mongolia would be in no position to receive them.  Yet given
the premise that only a complete collapse of the state could precipitate a viable
independence movement and internal civil war in Xinjiang, there would be few
places the Han would be able to go. Certainly, the bordering provinces of Gansu
and Qinghai would be just as disrupted, and Tibet would not be an option. Uyghur
refugees would most likely seek to move south, since the north would be domi-
nated by the Han and the western routes would be closed off by Kazakhstan and
Kyrgystan. That leaves only the southern routes, and with the exception of Paki-
stan, no nation in the region would probably be equipped to receive them. Cer-
tainly, they would not be better off in present-day Tajikistan and Afghanistan.
Given the on-going conflicts in Kashmir, even Pakistan, the most likely recipi-
ent of Uyghur refugees, would probably not wish further destabilization of the
region. Note also that the main southern route to India and Pakistan, along the
Karakhorum highway through the Torghurat pass, is generally passable less than
six months out of the year. India, despite its poor relations with China, would
certainly not want to add to its Muslim population. During many conversations
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in Xinjiang with local residents, Muslim and Han alike, it became clear that this
fact is well-known. Most think that in such a worst-case scenario, there would
be nothing to do but stay and fight.
Clearly, China needs a new approach to resolve tensions in Xinjiang; purely
Marxist and Keynesian economic development strategies are not enough.  The
“Develop the West” campaign described by Weimer has slowed considerably
since September 11, and tourism has slowed dramatically in the region.  The
state’s economic investment plan has proven not to be a panacea for resolving
on-going ethnic and problems in the region, that are based on more than just
poverty.  In a July-August 2002 Foreign Affairs article, Chien-Peng Chung of
the Singaporean Institute of Defense and Strategic Studies, called for an imme-
diate political changes in the region to avoid further deterioration in ethnic rela-
tions.37  To further this discussion, I would like to suggest possible new models
for Xinjiang’s future, peaceful development, something that all Uyghurs and
Chinese, as well as the other 24 ethnic groups in the region, seem to want.
 The Alaska model:  Award residents of Xinjiang direct dividends for
returns on wealth derived from regional natural resources, in accord with Ar-
ticle Two of the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights
mentioned above.  By according benefits to all 2nd or 3rd generation residents of
Xinjiang, China can perhaps obviate inter-ethnic tensions in the region and de-
flect criticisms that recent non-local migrants “lured to the region” by a govern-
ment interested in integration through immigration are the real beneficiaries of
China’s increased investment of the region.
 The Scotland model:  Although it is clear China would never con-
sider granting full independence to the region (lest it lose its authority over
Tibet and Taiwan as well), an approach that grants the region more control over
its own resources and governance, while maintaining central control over na-
tional defense and international trade would not only seem to make sense in the
modern era, but parallels traditional models of Chinese imperial control of the
region under the last dynasty.
 The Hawai’i model:  China must find a way to allow its local peoples
to legally, democratically, and officially express their concerns about the devel-
opment process in the region, the future directions of tourism and trade, and the
prospects for greater autonomy and sovereignty.  In the state of Hawai’i, elected
members of the Office of Hawaiian Affairs (OHA) receive state and federal
37 Chien-Peng Chung “China’s War on Terror’: September 11 and Uighur Separatism”   Foreign Affairs July/
August 2002: 8.
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funding for gathering input from indigenous Hawaiian peoples and determining
the future of Hawaiian sovereignty initiatives, allowing for open and public
debate about the real possibilities for independence, nationhood, further au-
tonomy, and the future of Hawaiian lands.
 The Australia model:  Peoples regarded by themselves and interna-
tional organizations as aboriginal and indigenous must have the right to address
land and environmental rights issues, despite government disagreements about
historical migration to the region.  As yet, China’s extremely beneficial special
entitlement laws for the official minority nationalities, including nationwide bi-
lingual education, exemption from many taxes and birth-planning restrictions,
and educational advancement opportunities apply only to those regarded by the
state as designated official minorities, and not to those regarded as indigenous
to a region or district (Korean migrants to Xinjiang have as many rights as
Uyghur).  China has no laws pertaining to indigenous rights, and often regards
treaties relating to “peoples” as affecting all the peoples of China, including the
Han majority, when their original intent was to alleviate suffering of underprivi-
leged indigenes.
 The West Bank model?  International observers and frequent visitors
to the region are concerned that if China does not explore other options besides
repression, restriction, and investment, millions of Uyghur Muslims might be-
come increasingly marginalized and disenfranchised, encouraging some of the
more disgruntled among them to look to the Intifada, the Taliban, or the al Qaida
for inspiration.  This would not be in China’s or the West’s interest in the region,
both of which publicly support goals of stability, prosperity, and human rights.
China is a sovereign state, and like all modern nations in the era of global-
ization faces tremendous challenges from migration, economic imbalance, eth-
nic unrest, and cyber-separatism.  Clearly, the Xinjiang model must be as unique
to the region as the region is to China itself.  Not unlike Hong Kong (which
under the one country, two systems formulae continues to fly its own flag), and
many proposals for Taiwan integration, the unique situation in Xinjiang, and
possibly Tibet, calls for dramatic and creative solutions to local opposition in
the region documented in this paper.  The future of this vastly important region,
which Owen Lattimore once called the “pivot of Asia,” depends upon it.
In the past 10 years, the opening of China to the outside world has meant
much for the Uyghur who may easily travel beyond China’s borders through
Pakistan along the Karakhoram highway, through the Ili valley into Kazakhstan,
or by several CAAC flights to Istanbul from Urumqi. The number of Uyghur
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pilgrims travelling on the Hajj to Mecca has increased by 300 per cent. These
contacts have allowed the Uyghur to see themselves as participants in the broader
Islamic Umma, while at the same time being Muslim citizens of the Chinese
nation-state. As they return from the Hajj, many Uyghur who generally travel
together as a group have told me that they gained a greater sense of affinity with
their own as one people than with the other multi-ethnic members of the interna-
tional Islamic community. State promoted tourism of foreign Muslims and tour-
ists to Muslim areas in China in hopes of stimulating economic investment is
also an important trend related to this opening of Xinjiang and its borders.
Urumqi, a largely Han city constructed in the last fifty years, is undergoing an
Islamic facelift with the official endorsement of Central Asian and Islamic ar-
chitecture which serves to impress many visiting foreign Muslim dignitaries.
Most foreigners come to see the colourful minorities and the traditional dances
and costumes by which their ethnicity is portrayed in Chinese and foreign travel
brochures. One Japanese tourist with whom I once spoke in Kashgar, who had
just arrived by bicycle from Pakistan across the Karakhorum highway, said that
a tourist brochure told him that the real Uyghurs could only be found in Kashgar,
whereas most Uyghur believe that Turfan is the centre of their cultural universe.
Yet many of these Kashgaris will in the same breath argue that much of tradi-
tional Uyghur culture has been lost to Han influence in Turfan and that since
they themselves are the repositories of the more unspoiled “Uyghur” traditions,
tourists should spend their time, and money, in Kashgar. This search for the so-
called “real Uyghur” confirms that the nationality statistics and tourism agen-
cies have succeeded. The re-creation of Uyghur ethnicity has come full circle:
the Chinese nation-state has identified a people who have in the last 40 years
taken on that assigned identity as their own, and in the process, those who have
accepted that identity have sought to define it and exploit it on their own terms.
The Uyghur believe they have a 6,000 year cultural and physical history in the
region. They are not likely to let it go. Unless new models are explored, patterns
of opposition may coalesce to increasingly resist Chinese control and develop-
ment of the region.
